Self-deception is the process of denying or rationalizing the relevance, significance, or importance of challenging logical proofs and arguments. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of the truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not reveal self-knowledge about fraud.
Video Self-deception
Theorization
Analysis
The traditional paradigm of self-deception is modeled after interpersonal fraud, where A deliberately gets B to believe some propositions p , while know or believe really Ã,¬ p (not p ). Such fraud is intentional and requires fraudsters to know or trust p and who are deceived to trust p . In this traditional mode, self-deceivers must (1) hold conflicting beliefs and (2) deliberately put themselves in a belief that they know or believe is completely wrong.
The process of rationalization, however, may obscure the intent of self-deception. Brian McLaughlin illustrates that such rationalization in certain circumstances permits the occurrence of the phenomenon. When a person, who does not believe p , deliberately tries to make himself believe or continue to trust p by engaging in such activity, and, as a result, inadvertently misleading himself for believe or continue to trust p through biased thinking, he is deceiving himself in a way that is suitable for self-deception. No fraudulent intent is required for this.
Psychology
Self-deception questions the nature of the individual, especially in the psychological context and "self" nature. Irrationality is the foundation upon which the paradoxes of self-deception are debated, and he thinks that not everyone has a "special talent" and the capacity to deceive oneself. However, rationalization is influenced by various factors, including socialization, personal bias, fear, and cognitive repression. Such rationalizations can be manipulated in positive and negative modes; convince someone to see the negative situation optimistically and vice versa. On the contrary, rationalization alone can not effectively clarify the self-deceiving dynamics, because reason is only one adaptive form of mental process that can be taken.
Paradoxes
The works of the philosopher Alfred R. Mele have given insight into some of the more prominent paradoxes of self-deception. These two paradoxes include self-imposter state and self-deception, creating a "static" paradox and a "dynamic/strategic" paradox, respectively.
Mele formulated the paradoxical example of "static" as follows:
If someone A deceives someone B to believe something, p , that's right, A know or really believe that p is wrong while causing B to believe that p is true. So when A deceives A (that is, herself) to believe that p is true, he knows or really believes that p is wrong while causing him to believe that p is true. Thus, A must simultaneously believe that p is wrong and believe that p is true. But how is this possible?
Mele then explains the "dynamic/strategy" paradox:
In general, A did not succeed in implementing a deceptive strategy against B if B knowing the intent and plan A . This seems reasonable when A and B are the same person. Potential fraudster's knowledge of her intentions and strategies will seem typical to make her ineffective. On the other hand, the suggestion that self-deceivers usually succeed in executing their self-deception strategies without knowing what they are doing may seem unreasonable; for the effective execution of agents of his plans in general seems to depend on his awareness of them and their aims. So how, in general, can an agent deceive itself by using self-deceiving strategies?
These models question how one can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs (the "static" paradox) and deceive oneself without making one's intentions ineffective (the "dynamic/strategic" paradox). The attempt at resolution for this has created two schools of thought: it maintains that the paradigmatic cases of self-deception are deliberate and that deny the intentional- and deliberate ideas of each other -something.
Intentionalists tend to agree that self-deception is deliberate, but divides it whether it requires the holding of contradictory beliefs. This school of thought combines elements of temporal partition (extended over time to benefit self-deceivers, increases the likelihood of forgetting fraud altogether) and psychological partition (combining various aspects of "self").
Conversely, non-intentional, inclined to believe that cases of self-deception are not always coincidental, but motivated by desire, anxiety, or some other emotion about p or related to p
Many questions and debates continue to play in connection with the paradox of self-deception, and the consensual paradigm has not yet emerged.
Trivers' Theory
It has been theorized that humans are vulnerable to self-deception because most people have an emotional attachment to conviction, which in some cases may not make sense. Some evolutionary biologists, such as Robert Trivers, have suggested that fraud plays an important part in human behavior, and in animal behavior, more commonly speaking. One deceives oneself into believing something untrue to further convince others of the truth. When someone convinces himself of this unrighteous thing, they better cover up the signs of deception.
This idea is based on the following logic: deception is a fundamental aspect of communication in nature, both within and within species. It has evolved so that one can have an advantage over another. From an alarm call to mimicry, animals use deceit to continue their survival. Those who are better able to sense deception are more likely to survive. As a result, self-deception evolved to better mask the deception of those who saw it well, as Trivers put it: "Hiding the truth from oneself to hide it deeper than others." In humans, the awareness of the fact that a person acts with a trick often leads to signs of deceit, such as nostrils, moist skin, quality and tone of voice, eye movements, or excessive blinking. Therefore, if self-deception allows one to believe in or distort himself, they will not show any signs of such deception and therefore will appear to be telling the truth.
Self-deception can be used either to act bigger or lower than it really is. For example, a person may act too confidently to attract a spouse or act less confident to avoid predators or threats. If a person is able to conceal his true feelings and intentions well, then they are more likely to succeed in deceiving others.
It may also be argued that the ability to deceive, or deceive oneself, is not a chosen trait but a by-product of the more important characteristic of so-called abstract thinking. Abstract thinking allows many evolutionary advantages such as more flexible behavior, adaptation and innovation. Since lies are abstractions, the mental process of creating lies can only occur in animals with sufficient brain complexity to allow abstract thinking. In addition, self-deception lowers cognitive costs; that is, if someone has convinced himself that it is true, it will be harder for someone to behave or think in a certain way. The mind will not always think the right thing and then the wrong thing, but just convince itself that the wrong thing is true.
Evolutionary implications
Because there is a lie, there is a strong choice to recognize when fraud occurs. As a result, self-deception evolves so it is better to hide the signs of fraud from others. The presence of fraud explains the existence of innate ability to commit self-deception to hide fraud indications. People deceive themselves to further deceive others and thus have an edge over them. In the three decades since Trivers introduced the adaptive theory of self-deception, there has been an ongoing debate about issues of behavior that have a genetic basis.
The explanation of fraud and self-deception as an innate characteristic may be true, but there are many other explanations for this pattern of behavior. It is possible that the ability to deceive oneself is not innate, but a learned character, gained through experience. For example, a person may be caught lying by revealing their knowledge of the information they are trying to hide. Their nostrils flare up, indicating that they are lying to others, and thus not getting what they want. Next time, to achieve success better, the person will more actively cheat himself to have the knowledge to hide the signs of deception better. Therefore, one can have the ability to learn self-deception. However, just because something learned does not mean that it is not innate; what is learned and what the innate work in relation to. This is described in many introductory books in evolutionary psychology.. For example, readiness (learning) occurs in learning to explain why some behaviors are more easily learned in others. Certain attributes, while they can be learned, are also innate.. Evolutionary psychologists argue that there is a learning mechanism that enables learning to occur. Thus, while self-deception can be learned, it does not exclude the evolutionary or genetic.
Medicine
Self-deception has an important role in some medical conditions, such as borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and histrionic personality disorder.
Maps Self-deception
Example
Simple examples of self-deception include a common occurrence such as: an alcoholic who deceives himself by believing his drink is under control, a husband who deceives himself by believing his wife is not cheating, a jealous fellow who deceives himself by believing that his partner's more professional success great is because of the cruel ambitions.
Examples of self-fraud provided by Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton were published in the form of an analysis of the role of self-deceased aircraft crash in the Florida Air Flight 90 crash.
See also
References
Further reading
Books
- HÃÆ'  ¥ llÃÆ'  © n, Elinor (2011). Different Types of Ignorance: Self Fraud as Flight from Self-Knowledge. Diss. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet. ISBN 978-91-506-2206-5.
- Leadership and Deception , by the Arbinger Institute. ISBN: 978-1-57675-977-6
- Anatomy of Peace: Resolving the Heart of the Conflict , by the Arbinger Institute. ISBN 978-1-57675-334-7
- McLaughlin, Brian P. & amp; Amà ©  © lie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) (1988). Perspective on Self-Deception. California UP: Berkeley etc. PhilPapers: MCLPOS
- Trivers, R. (2011). The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Fraud and Self Deception in Human Life . Basic Book. ISBN 978-0-465-02755-2
Journal
- Theorem , Vol. XXVI/3, Monography on Self Fraud: Conceptual Issues, Autumn 2007
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Vol. 20 (1), 1997.
- Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2007). "The Spandrels of Self-Deception: The Prospect of The Biological Theory of Mental Phenomena". Philosophy of Psychology . 20 (3): 329-348. doi: 10.1080/09515080701197148.
Reference sources
- Kirsch, Julie. "Ethics and Self-Deception". Encyclopedia of Internet Philosophy . Paulhus, Delroy L. (2007). "Self Fraud" (PDF) . In Baumeister, Roy; Vohs, Kathleen. Encyclopedia of Social Psychology . SAGE Publications. doi: 10.4135/9781412956253.n479. ISBN 9781412916707. Archived from the original in 2016-06-23. CS1 maint: BOT : original- unknown url status (link)
External links
- Skeptical Dictionary entries about self-fraud
- Arbinger Institute - a consulting organization based on Terry Warner's work on self-deception
- The pattern behind self-fraud
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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