In economics, public-swimming pool resources ( CPR ) are a good type of natural or man-made resource systems (eg irrigation systems or fishing grounds) whose size or characteristics make it expensive, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from benefiting from their use. Unlike pure public goods, common pool resources face congestion or overuse problems, as they can be reduced. A pool-common resource typically consists of a core resource (eg water or fish), which defines stock variables , while providing a limited number of extractable fraction units, which define the flow variable . While core resources must be protected or maintained to allow for continuous exploitation, peripheral units may be harvested or consumed.
Video Common-pool resource
Sistem properti umum
A common property regime system (not to be confused with common resources) is a particular social arrangement that regulates the preservation, maintenance, and consumption of shared resources. The use of the term "common property resource" to designate a good type has been criticized, since common-pool resources are not always governed by common property protocols. Examples of common resources are irrigation systems, fishing grounds, pastures, forests, water or atmosphere. A grassland, for example, allows a certain number of shepherding to occur each year without the core resource being harmed. However, in case of overgrowth, grasslands may become more susceptible to erosion and ultimately result in fewer benefits to its users. Because core resources are vulnerable, common resources are generally subject to congestion problems, overuse, pollution, and potential destruction unless harvesting or the use of boundaries are designed and enforced.
Maps Common-pool resource
Management
The use of many common resources, if carefully managed, can be extended because the resource system forms a negative feedback loop, where the stock variable continually regenerates fringe variables as long as the stock variable is not compromised, providing the optimal amount of consumption. However, consumption exceeds the periphery value reduces the stock variables, which in turn decreases the flow variable. If the stock variables are allowed to regenerate then the frinji and flow variables can also be recovered to the initial level, but in many cases, the losses can not be fixed.
Ownership
Common-pool resources can be owned by national, regional or local governments as public goods, by communal groups as shared property resources, or by private individuals or companies as private goods. When they are not owned by anyone, they are used as open access resources. After observing a number of shared pool resources around the world, Elinor Ostrom noticed that some of them are governed by common property protocols - different arrangements of private ownership or state administration - based on self-management by local communities. His observations contradict the claim that shared pool resources should be privatized or others face long-term destruction because of collective action problems leading to excessive use of core resources (see also Common Tragedy).
Definition Matrix
General property protocol
A common property management system arises when users act independently threatening the total net benefits of common resources. To retain resources, the protocol coordinates a strategy to defend resources as a common property rather than dividing it into a private parcel. Public property systems typically protect core resources and allocate marginal resources through complex community norms of consensus decision making. General resource management must face the difficult task of drafting rules that limit the amount, time, and technology used to draw various resource units from the resource system. Setting the excessively high limits will lead to excessive use and ultimately to the destruction of core resources while setting too low limits will reduce the benefits gained by users.
In the public property system, access to resources is not free and public resources are not public goods. Although there is relatively free but monitored access to resource systems for community members, there are mechanisms that allow communities to exclude outsiders using their resources. Thus, in a state of common ownership, resources come together as personal goods for outsiders and as a common good for people in the community. Resource units drawn from the system are usually owned individually by the users. General goods are rivaled in consumption.
Analyzing the design of a long-term CPR institute, Elinor Ostrom identifies eight design principles that are prerequisites for stable CPR settings:
- Clearly defined boundaries
- Compatibility between allocation rules and local terms and conditions
- Collective selection settings that allow participation of most applicators in the decision process
- Effective monitoring by monitors that are part of or accountable to users
- Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect community rules
- Inexpensive and easily accessible conflict resolution mechanisms
- Minimal recognition of the right to organize (eg, by government)
- In the case of larger CPRs: Organizations are in the form of multiple layers of nested companies, with small local CPRs at their bases.
A common property system usually works at the local level to prevent over-exploitation of the resource system from which the peripheral unit can be extracted. In some cases, government regulations combined with tradable environmental benefits (TEA) are used successfully to prevent over-pollution, whereas in other cases - especially in the absence of a unique government capable of setting limits and monitoring economic activity - excessive use or pollution continues.
Adaptive governance
The management of common resources is highly dependent on the type of resources involved. Effective strategies in one location, or from a single resource, may not always be appropriate for others. In the Pool-Swimming Resources Challenge, Ostrom makes the case for adaptive governance as a method for the management of public resources. Adaptive governance is suitable for handling complex, uncertain, and fragmented issues, such as general resource management. Ostrom outlines five basic protocol requirements for achieving an adaptive government. These include:
- Achieve accurate and relevant information, focusing on creating and using timely scientific knowledge on the part of both managers and resource users
- Dealing with conflicts, acknowledging the fact that conflicts will occur, and having systems to find and resolve them as quickly as possible
- Improve regulatory compliance, by creating responsibility for resource users to monitor usage
- Provide infrastructure, flexible over time, both to assist internal operations and create links to other resources
- Encourage customization and change to resolve errors and address new developments
Open access resources
In economics, open access resources, for the most part, competing goods, can not be excluded. This makes them similar to ordinary items during a period of prosperity. Unlike many common goods, open access items require little oversight or may be difficult to limit access. However, since these resources first come, first served, they may be affected by the phenomenon of a common tragedy. Two possibilities can follow: public property or open access system.
Open access systems are set up to continue the ideals of open access resources where everything is ready to be taken, e.g., Land. This occurred during the expansion of the western US region where thousands of hectares were given to the first to claim and cultivate the land.
However, in different settings, such as fishing, there will be very different consequences. Because fish is an open access resources, fish and profit is relatively easy. If fishing becomes profitable, there will be more fishermen and fewer fish. Fewer fish lead to higher prices that will lead to more fishermen, as well as lower fish reproduction. This is a negative externality and examples of problems that arise with open access goods.
See also
- Carrying capacity
- Commons
- Enclosures
- Exploitation of natural resources
- Global commons
- General knowledge
- Residential relationships
- Over-exploit
- Shared tragedy
- The tyranny of a small decision
References
Quote
Bibliography
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- Ostrom, Elinor (1990) "Organizing The Commons, Institutional Evolution for Collective Action". Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0-521-40599-8
- Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (1994) Rules, Games, and General Resources-Pool. University of Michigan Press. 1994. ISBNÃ, 978-0-472-06546-2
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- Thompson, Jr., Barton H. (2000) "Difficult Tragic: Obstacles to Organizing The Commons" Environmental Law 30: 241.
External links
- Digital Commons Library
- Public Goods vs. Private
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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